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How should we theorize algorithms?
Five ideal types in analyzing
algorithmic normativities
Francis Lee1 and Lotta Björklund Larsen2
Abstract
The power of algorithms has become a familiar topic in society, media, and the social sciences. It is increasingly common
to argue that, for instance, algorithms automate inequality, that they are biased black boxes that reproduce racism, or
that they control our money and information. Implicit in many of these discussions is that algorithms are permeated with
normativities, and that these normativities shape society. The aim of this editorial is double: First, it contributes to a
more nuanced discussion about algorithms by discussing how we, as social scientists, think about algorithms in relation to
five theoretical ideal types. For instance, what does it mean to go under the hood of the algorithm and what does it mean
to stay above it? Second, it introduces the contributions to this special theme by situating them in relation to these five
ideal types. By doing this, the editorial aims to contribute to an increased analytical awareness of how algorithms are
theorized in society and culture. The articles in the special theme deal with algorithms in different settings, ranging from
farming, schools, and self-tracking to AIDS, nuclear power plants, and surveillance. The contributions thus explore, both
theoretically and empirically, different settings where algorithms are intertwined with normativities.
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This article is a part of special theme on Algorithmic Normativities. To see a full list of all articles in this special
theme, please click here: https://journals.sagepub.com/page/bds/collections/algorithmic_normativities.
The omnipresence of algorithms
Algorithms are making an ever-increasing impact on
our world. In the name of efficiency, objectivity, or
sheer wonderment algorithms are becoming increas-
ingly intertwined with society and culture. They seem
pervasive in today’s society, materializing here, there,
and everywhere. In some situations, algorithms are
valued, or even treasured, in others they lead to anger
and mistrust, sometimes they even seem threatening or
dangerous.
In the wake of this algorithmization of the world,
social scientists have taken an increasing interest in how
algorithms become intertwined with society and cul-
ture. The list of interventions and perspectives seems
endless.1 Some researchers claim that algorithms con-
trol money and information (Pasquale, 2015) or shape
our romantic endeavors (Roscoe and Chillas, 2015).
Others highlight the inscrutability of algorithms and
work to understand the effects of their opacity
(Burrell, 2016; Diakopoulos, 2016; Fourcade and
Healy, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). Still others argue that
algorithms automate inequality (Eubanks, 2017;
Noble, 2018; O’Neil, 2016), and reproduce existing
social structures and biases (Angwin et al., 2016;
Kirkpatrick, 2016; Sandvig et al., 2016). In line with
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this, many researchers have started asking questions
about algorithmic decision-making (Zarsky, 2015),
accountability (Diakopoulos, 2016), or ethics
(Kraemer et al., 2010; Neyland, 2018). Implicitly, or
sometimes very explicitly, many of these observe
that algorithms are intertwined with different normativ-
ities and that these normativities come to shape our
world.
In our view, however, there is a need for a meta-
discussion about how normativities become intertwined
with algorithms. That is, there is today a bounty of
approaches, as evident from above, and a growing
body of analytical perspectives on algorithms.
However, there are few, if any, meta-analytical discus-
sions that attempt to deal with the strengths and weak-
nesses of different theoretical and analytical
approaches. Consequently, this special theme seeks to
provoke a meta-reflection on how social and cultural
researchers come to theorize, analyze, and understand
algorithmic normativities.
Five ideal types in analyzing algorithms
In essence, what we are asking is what alternatives there
are to emphasizing opacity, black-boxing, and a seduc-
tive language of uncovering ‘biased’, ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’
algorithms? What other ways of approaching algo-
rithms are there apart from going under the ‘opaque’
hood to understand the real politics of the ‘black
boxed’ algorithms? To stimulate this meta-reflection,
and help think these issues through, we want to draw
playfully on the metaphor of the engine hood. We ask
what positions, other than ‘going under the hood’ to
uncover the hidden normativities of the algorithm, are
there?
The goal of this exercise is to reflect on and prob-
lematize current ways of analyzing algorithms, and to
situate the articles in this special theme in relation to a
meta-reflection about how we analyze algorithmic nor-
mativities.2 In doing this, we outline five ideal-typical
accounts of algorithms in society and situate them in
relation to classical analytical positions in Science and
Technology Studies (STS), where debates about the
social analysis of technology abound. In outlining
these analytical ideal types, we also summarize and situ-
ate each article in this special theme in relation to these
ideal types.
We are aware that this strategy risks foregrounding
some perspectives while backgrounding others. There is
also a risk that we become too harsh in our ideal typing
by omitting and downplaying overlaps and similarities
between different perspectives. So, bear with us if we do
violence to more nuanced and multifaceted perspectives
when we pull some things apart and push some other
things together.
Under the hood: The politics of
algorithms
Let us start by going under the hood. A number of
researchers maintain that we must analyze algorithms
themselves and go under the hood to understand their
inherent politics (cf. Ruppert et al., 2017). Several social
scientists interested in algorithms or Big Data gather in
this camp. For instance, philosophers sometimes like to
debate the algorithmic ethics of self-driving cars
(Nyholm and Smids, 2016), or racial bias in facial rec-
ognition (Chander, 2017), while other analysts have
dealt with the algorithmic biases of criminal risk pre-
diction (Angwin et al., 2016).
In this analytical ideal type, the logic of the algo-
rithm appears like a deus ex machina impinging on soci-
ety’s material politics. This analytical ideal type draws
on similar logics to Langdon Winner’s (1980) classic
article that deals with the politics of technological arti-
facts. In his analysis, it is the functioning of the techno-
logical system that is in focus, and Winner invites us to
see artifacts as materialized laws that redefine how we
can act for generations to come.
Algorithms are also productively and provocatively
understood in this way. For instance, in Christopher
Miles contribution to this special theme, he fruitfully
illustrates how algorithms become intertwined with spe-
cific normativities in American farming. Miles shows
that although new digital practices are introduced,
existing socio-economic normativities are often
preserved or even amplified. Thus, the supposedly
radical changes in farming practices, suggested by
precision agriculture algorithms, only affect certain
parts of farming but also seem to thwart other imagined
futures.
In this type of analysis of algorithms, just as in the
case with Winner’s bridges, the politics, effects, and
normativities that are designed into algorithms
become foregrounded. A crucial task for the researcher
thus becomes to analyze invisible algorithmic norma-
tivities to understand how they are imbued with power
and politics. However, with this type of analysis, might
we risk losing sight of the practices, negotiations, and
human action that algorithms always are intertwined
with? Might we become so seduced by the algorithms,
that we forget the many social practices that surround
them?
Working above the hood: Algorithms
in practice
What would happen if we instead stay above the hood
and never get our hands dirty with the nuts and bolts of
the inscrutable algorithms? Here, on the other side of
our constructed spectrum of ideal types, we could place
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ethnomethodological analyses of the achievement of
social order. In this analytical position, algorithms
would emerge as ‘contingent upshot of practices,
rather than [as] a bedrock reality’ (Woolgar and
Lezaun, 2013: 326).
In terms of classic studies of materiality in social
interaction, Charles Goodwin’s (2000) analysis of the
classification of dirt might serve as emblematic. In his
article, Goodwin analyzes the interaction, talk, point-
ing, disagreement, that happens when archaeologists
attempt to classify dirt color using a so-called
Munsell-chart. Goodwin shows how the human prac-
tices of interpreting and debating is crucial to under-
standing how the meaning of material artifacts is
decided.
In relation to algorithms, Malte Ziewitz’ (2017)
account of an ‘algorithmic walk’ also humorously
points us toward the negotiations that surround most
algorithms. He highlights the constant work of inter-
preting, deciding, and debating about algorithms. In an
auto-ethnographic experiment, Ziewitz takes a stroll
with a friend in the streets of Oxford and makes it
into an algorithmic walk. Before the walk, Ziewitz
and his friend construct strict algorithmic rules for
how to turn at intersections during the walk. But walk-
ing like an algorithm turns out to be a difficult task, and
Ziewitz and his friend soon start debating the meaning
of the algorithm. What direction does the algorithm
want us to go at this intersection?
In this vein, Lotta Björklund Larsen and Farzana
Dudwhala’s contribution to this special theme also dis-
cusses how humans adapt to algorithmic outputs, an
adaptation that includes normative ideas about how
the outcomes of algorithms are interpreted as normal
or abnormal. Their argument is that the output of algo-
rithms trigger, or as they propose, recalibrate human
responses. Sometimes accepting the algorithmic output,
sometimes not, so that an understanding of a normal
situation can be achieved.
In another article in this special theme, Patricia
DeVries and Willem Schinkel also undertake an ana-
lysis of the practical politics of algorithms. In their art-
icle, they analyze how three artists construct anti-
facial-recognition face masks to critique and resist
facial recognition systems. They take these face masks
as a starting point for exploring the social anxiety
around surveillance and control. DeVries and
Schinkel argue that there is a tendency, in these
works, to defend a liberal modernist construction of
the autonomous subject and the private self. The mean-
ing of both the face masks and the surveillance algo-
rithms are thus negotiated in practice.
This analytical stance elegantly sidesteps the discus-
sion about which nefarious or biased politics are
designed into the algorithm. The human negotiations
drawing on contexts, materialities, or even face masks,
become foregrounded. Opening the opaque and black
boxed algorithm to decode its inscrutable politics
becomes almost irrelevant; it is the interpretation in
practice that is in focus. However, do we then, by work-
ing above the hood, risk omitting what algorithms are
actually constructed to do? And, we might ask, what
then is the price of staying over the hood to focus on
practice?
Hoods in relations: Non-human agency
and black boxes
This brings us to the ideal type that approaches algo-
rithms, and technology, through an analysis of non-
human agency and relationality—perhaps a middle
road between going under the hood and staying
above it? This analytical ideal type focuses on the inter-
twining of human and non-human actors (cf. Callon
and Law, 1995).3 Here, for instance, Actor-Network
Theory (ANT) in its various guises zooms in on the
effects of how both non-human and human actors are
intertwined (Latour, 1987).4
Relationalities are, for example, the focus of the art-
icle by Francis Lee, Jess Bier, Jeffrey Christensen,
Lukas Engelmann, Claes-Fredrik Helgesson, and
Robin Williams. The authors criticize the current
focus on fairness, bias, and oppression in algorithm
studies as a step toward objectivism. Instead, they pro-
pose to pay attention to operations of folding to high-
light how algorithms fold a multitude of things, such as
data, populations, simulations, or normalities. For
instance, they show how the algorithmic calculation
of the spread of an epidemic can produce particular
populations or countries as being close to an epidemic,
while others seem safely distant. The algorithmic pro-
duction of different relations thus having potentially
far-reaching consequences for both individuals and
nations.
Similarly, in a comment on accountability and
authorship, Elizabeth Reddy, Baki Cakici, and
Andrea Ballestero highlight, through the algorithmic
experiments of a comic book artist, how algorithms
can do much of the work of assembling detective stor-
ies. Yet, accountability is still organized, normatively
and legally, around human authorship and human
agency. So, although algorithms might produce ‘the
work,’ ideas about authorship and accountability are
still organized around human subjectivity and agency.
They observe that there seems to be a tendency to
ascribe agency to humans over machines (cf. Callon
and Law, 1995).
In this ideal type, by focusing on the practices of
relational ordering, we can come to understand the
complex mixing of agencies and accountabilities
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between algorithms and humans. Instead of seeing
black boxed algorithms as a delimiter for a study, this
position sees it as the starting point for inquiry.5
Attempting to discern both how the algorithm func-
tions and how it relates to human practice is the
modus operandi. Perhaps one might describe this ideal
type as combining ‘going under the hood’ with the
practice oriented ‘staying above the hood’ ideal types.
However, this relational perspective has also been cri-
ticized for being apolitical and blind to the power-
struggles of weaker actors, as well as the political effects
that algorithms could have on the world (cf. Galis and
Lee, 2014; Star, 1991; Winner, 1993).
Lives around hoods: Torque,
classification, and social worlds
Let us widen the lens even more: From detailed studies
of interaction, negotiation, and relationality to an ana-
lysis of neighborhoods (da-dum-tsch). This analytical
position takes an interest in infrastructures of classifi-
cation and their interaction with human biographies.
Here, the politics of infrastructures and classification
become the focus. These types of analyses highlight
how people’s lives become ‘torqued’, or twisted out of
shape, by classification systems.6
For instance, Bowker and Star (1999), in their classic
work on infrastructures of classification, show how the
socio-material race classification systems of the South
African apartheid regime affected human lives in some-
times unpredictable ways. For instance, a light brown
child born to dark brown parents could be forced to go
to school in another district. But they also show how
neighborhoods could come together to challenge the
classification system—as the definition of race in apart-
heid South Africa was founded on social and legal
negotiations.
In moving this ideal type to the algorithmic arena, a
thought-provoking approach might be Philip Roscoe’s
(2015) study of a kidney transplant algorithm in the
UK. He shows how the question ‘Who is a worthy
recipient of a kidney?’ is answered in algorithmic
form. But the algorithm—just as apartheid race classi-
fications—is tied to the valuations of worthy recipients.
Furthermore, just as neighbors could sometimes band
together to challenge a color classification in South
Africa, so can hospital staff today ‘game’ the algorithm
for a ‘worthy’ recipient, while the algorithm is still used
as an escape route from making heart-wrenching deci-
sions on life and death.
Such negotiated processes of classification are
also the center of attention in Helene Gad Ratner
and Evelyn Ruppert’s article in this special theme,
which analyses the transformation of data for statistical
purposes. In their text, they show how metadata and
data cleaning as aesthetic practices have normative
effects. Just as Bowker and Star (1999) dealt with the
struggles of, for instance, medical, biological, or racist
classifications, Ratner and Ruppert show how classifi-
cation struggles happen through the practices of data
cleaning. One instance they document is how absences
and indeterminacies in data are resolved through both
algorithmic and human interactions with the data.
Importantly, these interactions determine what
values the data can obtain. Thus, similar to how the
apartheid regime performed the population of
South Africa, Ratner and Ruppert bring analytical
awareness to the normative and performative effects
of classification work in relation to homeless and
student populations and how they are enacted by
infrastructures.
In this ideal type, the work of classification and
the relations between human lives and classification
systems becomes foregrounded. Here the politics of
twisting lives out of shape becomes the focus.
However, perhaps a risk is that we lose sight of the
detailed interactions of how social order is main-
tained in practice? Or does a focus on the algorithms
of classification risk leading us back, full circle,
to seeing algorithmic systems as having inherent
politics again?
The mobile mechanics: The power of
analytical reflexivity and mobility
Finally, we wish to highlight how a meta-reflexive and
meta-analytical attitude toward algorithms opens new
avenues for inquiry. By being attentive to how social
scientists relate to algorithms as well as to those who
work with them, our inherent normativities and pre-
sumptions come to the fore.
In this special theme, two articles analyze such inter-
ventions. David Moats and Nick Seaver challenge our
thinking about how computer scientists understand the
work of social scientists. In the article, Moats and
Seaver document their attempt to arrange an experi-
ment with computer scientists to test ingrained bound-
aries: how can the quantitative tools of computer
science be used for critical social analysis? As it turns
out, the authors were instead confronted with their own
normative assumptions. By sharing these insights, the
authors provoke the reader’s assumptions about the
normative disparities inherent in different scientific
disciplines.
Last, and in a similarly reflexive approach,
Jeremy Grosman and Tyler Reigeluth propose a meta-
framework for understanding algorithmic normativities.
Discussing the notion of normativity from the point of
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view of various analytical positions, algorithmic systems
are said to produce three kinds of normativities: tech-
nical, sociotechnical, and behavioral. The authors
argue that algorithmic systems are inhabited by norma-
tive tensions and that a fruitful approach is to explore the
tensions instead of the normativities themselves. Their
argument is that this approach allows them to show
which norms get more traction than others and perhaps
even suggest why this is so.
Conclusion
A point of departure for this special theme was that
algorithms are intertwined with normativities at every
step of their existence; in their construction, implemen-
tation, as well as their use in practice. The articles
explore theoretically and empirically different settings
where humans and non-humans engage in practices
that are intertwined with normative positions or have
normative implications. The array of theoretical
approaches—anxieties, pluralities, recalibrations,
folds, aesthetics, accountability—that implicate algo-
rithms force us to engage with the multiple normative
orders that algorithms are entangled with.
In the articles, we get to see how algorithms are
intertwined with, on the one hand, expectations of
how things ought to be—normative expectations—and,
on the other hand, how they enact the normal, the typ-
ical, as well as the abnormal and atypical. The articles
thus scrutinize ideas of normativities in and around
algorithms: how different normativities are enacted
with algorithms, and how different normativities are
handled when humans tinker with algorithms.
With this brief editorial, we hope to entice the reader
to explore the various contributions of this special
theme. We also hope to have shed light on how algo-
rithms are imbued with normativities at every step, and
how these normativities both shape and are shaped by
society. In this manner, the special theme seeks to con-
tribute to a more nuanced discussion about algorithmic
normativities in complex sociotechnical practices.
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1. See for instance, Amoore (2013); Beer (2009); Dourish
(2016); Gillespie (2014); Kitchin (2014); Neyland (2015);
Schüll (2012); Seaver (2017); Striphas (2015); Totaro and
Ninno (2014); Ziewitz (2017). See also the critical algo-
rithm studies list: https://socialmediacollective.org/read-
ing-lists/critical-algorithm-studies/
2. The articles in this special theme build on conversations
spanning three workshops and a PhD summer school on
algorithms in society that were held in Stockholm, Sweden,
between 2014 and 2017.
3. Also, Haraway’s (1992) metaphor of the ‘Coyote Trickster’
includes non-human actors in a material-semiotic analysis.
4. Classic ANT studies have highlighted for instance how
humans ‘enroll’ microbes, scallops, or speed-bumps in
their network to support their various causes.
5. Sometimes in critical algorithm studies, this challenge—to
stay above the hood in our playful metaphor—is expressed
as going ‘beyond opening the black box’ to study practice
and culture (cf. Geiger, 2017). From an ANT perspective,
this interpretation of the black box metaphor is misplaced.
It is precisely the manifold and complex relations that the
black box contains and relates to that is in focus in this
analytical ideal type. Going ‘beyond’ the black box in this
view reifies the idea that studying ‘the social’ is different
than studying ‘the technical.’
6. On torque see Bowker and Star (1999).
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